

Dulles - NSC Briefing

11 February 1953

Used - Three Korean items

Stalin's Interview w/ Argentine Ambassador

Round-up - Seventh Fleet Mission

25X1



EDC - French Socialists

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NSA review completed

State Department review completed

KOREA I (ground)

~~There are~~ Indications that three Chinese Communist armies which arrived in Korea in September and October replaced veteran armies there. ~~Thus the~~ move represents a rotation and not an overall increase in strength.

- 1) Enemy strength in Korea is estimated to be

CCF	795, 000
NK	<u>289, 000</u>
TOTAL	1, 084, 000

(up 40,000 in two weeks)

- 2) The T/O of a CCF army (three divisions) is 30, 000.
- 3) There are no indications that the enemy intends to launch a major offensive in the near future.

*twin engine
725 miles
with wing tanks*

KOREA II (air)

Some of the crews of the approximately 100 IL-28 bombers now stationed in Manchuria may now be ready for combat. The CCAF 8th Division (60 aircraft) should be ready by mid-April.

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- 1) The remaining 40 IL-28's are presumed to be with the NKAf.
 - 2) The 8th CCAF Division is stationed at Tsitsihar; the NKAf unit is at Kungchuling.
 - 3) The IL-28's operating out of their present bases could raid all of Korea and southern Japan with a two ton bomb, at a maximum speed of 460 knots (506 m.p.h.)

KOREA III (air)

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The number of MIG-15's observed during January totaled 2,213, the highest figure since March 1952. Forty of these were destroyed against the loss of only two F-86's. This increased ratio (normally about 8 to 1) ^{may} apparently result from greater participation by CCAF and NKAF units. *but not enough experience to judge*

- 1) The approximate breakdown of the over 1000 MIG-15's available for Korea is as follows:

NKAF 60

CCAF 500

SOVIET 500

- 2) Prior to September 1952 nearly all missions were believed to have been flown by Soviet pilots, but recently the CCAF has flown the majority of missions. NKAF participation has also increased.

2) MIG 15 strength is estimated at about 1060 planes.

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*Cards 5x8**(Cops)*

Comment on Stalin's interview with Argentine Ambassador

Stalin's granting of one of his rare interviews to the new Argentine Ambassador is the first-known top level Soviet effort to exploit the differences between the United States and Latin American nations caused by the sharp rise in economic nationalism and a wider acceptance of neutralist policies in that area. Stalin's personal attention possibly foreshadows a greater interest in Latin America, to which Soviet diplomacy has previously given relatively little attention

Back

Argentina is a suitable focal point for divisive efforts because of Peron's advocacy of neutralism and his efforts to substitute Argentine for United States leadership in the Western hemisphere.

We intend to present a briefing in greater depth on Latin America in the near future.

*Let
Do not end sentence ^{run} on two
cards.*

REACTIONS TO THE CHANGE IN THE MISSION OF

THE SEVENTH FLEET

Foreign reactions to the State of the Union Message were specifically reactions to the change in the mission of the Seventh Fleet. In general they followed Chiang Kai-shek gratified, hopes for closer organizational cooperation

with the US (interpreted by American Minister Rankin as possible "combined military staff") but will not interpret as inviting request for increased aid.

Chinese Communist press and radio comments have emphasized that this move is merely the latest evidence of American intentions to expand the Korean war as part of its aggression in the Far East. They are cheered by the divisive effects they see on the Western alliance, contemptuous of the immediate capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists though concerned over their eventual capabilities in view of "American plans to build up Chinese Nationalist forces."

North Korean press and radio reactions followed the same line.


South Korean government statements and press reaction greeted the move with acclaim.

Japan: There was no direct criticism from government officials or the non-Communist press though the latter expressed apprehension as to a possible expansion of the Korean war and its effects on Japanese trade.

Indonesia: General anxiety concerning the danger of expansion of hostilities.

well-established lines of national policies and were what might have been expected with the following exceptions: Australia and New Zealand, Yugoslavia, Latin America,

France: Official and press comments have been more exercised over the unilateral nature of the decision than over possible consequences. French world prestige in French eyes demands tripartite policies in the Far East. Press commentaries also expressed anxiety over possible expansion of hostilities and over possible neglect of Western European defense problems.

 Latin American comment generally applauds the new "clarity" and "decisiveness of United States policy toward China.

Soviet Union: Press commentaries followed the expected pattern of criticising the policy as indicative of American aggression in the Far East while at the same time emphasizing its divisive effects on the "capitalist coalition." The tone of the commentary was unexpectedly mild in comparison to Peiping's vituperation.

The Vietnamese, Thailand and the Philippines were generally reassured, seeing evidence of a desired stronger US policy in the Far East.

Burmese reaction has been especially unfavorable because of their fear that increased Chinese Nationalist activity will goad the Chinese Communists into overt action against Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma.

✓ Australia and New Zealand: Official statements recognize the right of the United States unilaterally to reverse what was originally a unilateral decision, though press comment contains an underlying uneasiness as to its consequences.

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✓ Yugoslavia: Government-controlled press expressed dissatisfaction on grounds that it increases possibility ^{that} Korean war will be extended, ~~and thus enable~~ ^{ING} the Soviet Union to tighten ^{its} grip on China.

Great Britain: Official protest on 31 January that the move entails no military advantage and does entail unfortunate political repercussions.

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[redacted] French Socialists will vote against treaty in ~~Parliament~~^{meny} and no likelihood of majority for treaty in French Parliament without Socialists.

OCI feels ~~this~~ estimate premature and unwarranted. If a total of 100 Socialists and Gaulists ^{either} vote for treaty or abstain from voting, ^{treaty} will pass. ~~Th~~ Thirty Socialists have already indicated will vote for it. ^{GUY MOLLET} Guy Mollet, Secretary General of Socialist Party, states he can influence additional 50% of party "within narrow limits" (Total Socialist seats 165, Communists 181, Gaulists 85, Total National Assembly - 627 seats). Consolidation of Mollet's position, not yet firm, is key to Socialist vote.

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EDC



file briefing


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Socialist Party is largest single party - (Socialists 105 seats, Communists 101, Gaullists 85 - total National Assembly 627 seats.)

OCI feels that if a total of 100 Socialists and Gaullists either vote for treaty or abstain from voting against it the treaty will pass. Embassy has already reported that 30 Gaullists will vote for treaty.

The implication of this report that Socialists will cast a bloc vote against treaty is premature and unwarranted.

The Secretary General of Socialist Party, Guy Mollet, told US embassy five days ago that one-quarter of Socialist deputies would vote for EDC even in violation of party discipline. An additional 50% of Socialist deputies, Mollet said, could be influenced by him within narrow limits. OCI and Embassy feel, therefore, that Mollet's position, which is not yet firm, is key to Socialist vote.



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